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IN TH~ SUPRE~E COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~ERT~UOE H. SNYDER, ) 
: 
Plelntlff end Respondent, ) 
vs. 
end 
I , 
I , ROBERT JAMES CLUNE 
ROY M. ~TOKES, a 
Oaendants and Appel I ants. ) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 9936 
STATEMENT OF THE KINO OF CASE 
This Is en action for personol Injuries al~ged 
to heve been received in an automobile accident 
one public highway In Utah County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Oefendents moved the lower court to dismiss 
the action on the grounds thet the Complaint of 
plelntiff was barred by the Statute of Limitet~n~ 
Tht lower court denied the motion. Appeltcnts 
then petitioned this court for en Intermediate 
apptel which was granted. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants ask that the Order of the lower 
:ourt denying thar motion to dismiss be reversed 
snd thet the action be dismissed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are ~pperent from the 
record or were agreed to by counsel 8t the heer-
lng on eppellents• motion to di$miss. 
1. This Is an action for person81 Injuries 
~lleged to h8ve occurred Jn an automobile acci-
dent on e pub I Jc highway In Utah County, U~ah, 
on December 14, 1958. 
2. Defendants and Appel Ients are not resi-
dents of the State of Utah, but resfde in the 
State of Call fornia, end as far _is known have not 
been in the State of Utah since the happening of 
th I s ecc I dent • 
3. Plelntiff filed the Complaint in question 
ICJvll No. 24,751) In the offIce of the Uteh 
County Clerk on December 17, 1962 -- four years 
end three days after the happening of the acddent. 
4 • P I a J n t I f f f I I e d an ear I i er c omp I a i n t i n 
the office of the Utah County Clerk CCJvi I No. 
2•,555) on December 13, 1961. 
Oefendents and appell~nts moved the court to 
dismiss the complaint upon the grounds that the 
four yeers Statute of Limitations had expired. 
At the hearing on the argument plaintiff raised 
three points which she alleges ere e complete 
answer to her failure to file wl thin the period 
I imJ ted by statute. These area 
1. That the filing on December 17, 1962, was 
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timely becuuse of en intervening weekend during 
which time the office of the Utah Courly Clerk was 
lege II y c I osed. 
2. Thet pl8intlff filed an action erising out 
of this eccident for these injuries on Jecember 
13, 1961, in utah County (Civi I No. 24,555) on 
which no ection was taken, but which piGintiff 
claims had the effect of extending the time for 
filing for one year from December 13, 1962. 
3. That the absence of defendants fr~~ the 
stete of utJh tolled the running of the 3tatute 
of Limitetlons end, therefore, plaintiff•s action 
J s time I y. 
P18intiff submits th~t under point ff3 which was 
relied on by the court, that the lower court 
did not err in denying defendants motion to 
dJs:nfss, end show this by consideration of pant 
13 raised by the pltslnti ff, end this point wi II 
bt treated as Point 1 of this brief. 
ARGU~\\ENT 
POINT 1. 
THAT THE A35ENCE OF )EFENDANTS FROM THE STATE 
OF UTAH TOLLED THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS AND, THEr<EFORE, PLAINTIFF'S ACTION 
I S T I '1\t: L Y • 
~,.e submit that the lsse reised by Defendants 
and Appellants motion is controlled by Utah :Code 
Annoteted, 1953, 78-12-35, which reads as fol~ws: 
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Effect of ebaence from state.--"lf when 
e ceuae of 8ctlon accrues egelnst a 
person when he Is out of the stete, the 
ection mey be commenced within the term 
herein limited after his return to the 
stete; and 1f after a cause of action 
accrues he departs from the state, the 
time of his 8bsence is not part of the 
time I im i ted for the convnencement of the 
act I on. •• 
Council for the defendants and appellants 
atipulated l»nd admitted to the lower court thet 
the defendents have been residents of the state 
of California ever since the cause of action 
arose, end stIll are res I dents of the state of 
CelifornitJ. The language of the statute, we 
feel, is very expl lei t and clear when 1 t reads, 
~ ••• and if, after e cause of action accrues, he 
departs from the state, the time of hlsesence 
Is not part of the time limited for the conmence-
ment of the action." iJe submit there is no 
•blgulty in the wording of the statuteJ the law 
limply says that if the defendents after the 
cause of action arose depart from the stete, the 
time that he is absent doesrot limit the 
conmencement of the act ion. 
The da&ndents in answer to the above section 
of the statute contends thet due to the fact 
thot the Sacret~ry of State could be served so 
os to acquire jurisdiction of the defendants and 
appellants, thet the statute on absence of the 
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defendants from the stete hea no applic.Jtion. 
Rt8dlng of the Non-resident Motorist Vehicle 
Act, Uteh Code Annoteted, 1953, 41-12-8, shows 
no reference whatsoever to the Utah stetute on 
the af feet of absence from the stete. If it was 
the Intent of the JegJslature to cut down the 
1eenlng ~nd effect of the statute dearing with 
absence from the state, they would have, we 
aubnft, stated In the Non-resident Motorist Ve-
h i c I e act. 
In the case of Keith O'Brien Company vs. 
Snyder, 51 u. 227, 160 P. 954, the Utah Sup~eme 
Court had before It the Utah statute wording 
exectly es set forth Jn Section 78-12-35, Utah 
:ode Annotated 1953. The court found that the 
~efendant deprted from the state end was absent 
therefrom for e period In excess of 5t years. 
It wes contended that an action could have been 
:oomenced ~g8inst the defendant at any time by 
aerving process on defendant's wife at the femi ly 
·esidence or place of abode. 
The Third Judicial Disrict Court in and for 
aalt lake County, State of Utah, found that the 
•ction was not barred by the Statute of LimJ ... 
'8tions, and that the pleintlff was entitled to 
luagmen t • The Supreme Court after rev lew of 
'he 8uthor it ies of the meaning of the statute 
·elative to absence from the state said: 
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"It Is not necessary to further review, 
or Quote from, the ceses; it must suffice 
thet the greet, the overwhelming weight 
of outhorlty, under statutes like ours, 
le Jn support of the decision of the 
District Court." 
The court pointed this out in connection with 
Interpreting statutes the fundamental rule when 
I t 
The Court in conclusion saidz 
t•tndeed, the authorities that hold that 
ebsence from the state tolls the statute, 
all 8gree thet the statute runs only during 
the time the debtor is openJ.y in the state 
end Immediately on his leaving it the 
stetute again ceases to run unti I his 
return, and that in computing time all 
the periods of absence must be considered 
8nd edded together. 
In view of the foregoing but one conclu-
sion Is permissible, whJch is, thet the 
Judgment of the district court is right, 
end should be affirmed. Such is the order." 
Defendants end appel I ants contend that the 
'Brien case having been decidedp--lor to the 
on-resident Motorist Vehicle :\ct is In effect 
oided by the passage of the Non~resident 
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Motorist Vehicle Act. There Is not e utah 
Supreme Court decision which supports defendants 
end appellents contention. There Is e late 
utah Supreme Court decision which indicates 
aupport of the decision of the Keith O'Brien 
case. 
This Is the case of Peutmina Nick Seely~ 
AdminJstr~trlx of the Estete of Jacobsen 
E. ~eely, ?l8lntlff and Appellant, vs. 
Amellft c. Cowley, Administratrix of the 
Estete of James H. Cowley, eka James He I I 
Cowley and James Cowley, Defendant end 
Respondent, decided October 9, 1961, 365 
P8clffc Reporter, 2nd, page 63. 
The Supr~e Court held that absence from the 
1 t ~ t e o f t h e mot or I s t • s a dm J n i s t r a t r J x t o I I e d 
the running of the two yeer statute of I Jml-
~etlons for wrongful deeth. The appellant 
:ontended that the court erred Jn applying thls 
•rovlslon In the statute of I imitations beca~se 
he defendant elmost Immediately efter, the 
'cminlstrctrfx absented herself from the state 
·f Utah, 8nd had been out of the state ever 
lnce, end that therefore the court should have 
pplled the provisions of Section 78-12~35, 
tah Code Annoteted 1953,the statute on effect 
f 8bsence from the state, the same identical 
tatute which is involved In our case. 
'''-L~v i ng de term I ned thet our statute of 
tlmJtetJon on wrongful death is not a 
llmitetion on liability, the question 
rem8Jns as to whether the provisions of 
Section 78-12-35 epply to a duly appointed 
personal represent~tive of an estate. 
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The problem where ~ personal rapresen~ 
tet1ve who can be SU@d h88 been appointed 
Is different from that in which no re~­
resentetive has been appointed. In the 
letter 1nst~nce our probete code gives a 
creditor 8 right to epply for letws of 
bdrrinlstratJo.-) if those who have preference 
do n0t ~pply et Ieese within three months. 
In the case of d ptrSon~t representative 
who h1s been appointed absenting himself 
from tht state there is no ebsolute remedy 
tJ which J creditor Is entitled. Absence 
from the stete is not among the grounds 
listed for revocation of letters of ad~inls­
tretion under the provisions of Section 
73-~-1, Ut~h Code Annotated, 1953, although 
it might be a reason deemed sufficient by 
a 'ourt and thus be e ground for removal 
under the authority of that section. 
Nevertheless, whether such a reason would 
be deemed sufficient by e court would depend 
Jpon the discretion of that court. Although 
1 c~)urt's discretion cannot be arbitr 1:1ri ty 
used, It could wei I be before that deter-
mination was :netde the two years woutd have 
elepsed ~nd a person who had a good cause 
of ection would thus be deprived of his 
rights unless the ebsence of the persJndl 
reoresentative of the estate of the wrongdoer 
tolled the stetute just as It does Jf the . 
wrJn~doer himself is alive and Is absent 
frJm the state. For this reason we ere of 
the opinion that Section 78-12-35 ~tahCode 
A,not~ted 1953, applied to a personal rep-
rese~tative of an estate who absents hl~seff 
fro-n the state end .therefore the court erred 
;~ granting the dismissal of the action on 
the ground th~t the action hed not been 
Jr·1'Jght within tv1o yeers ·as provided ·In 
Secti:Jn 78-12-35, Utah Code "nnotated, 1953. 
Reversed, Costs to appel lent.~ 
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we observe thet the court had before it the 
uestlon of absence of the defendent from the 
tete end s~ld nothing by way of overul ing the 
'Brlen case. Also, thet e new adminlstretor 
ould h~ve been eppinted, but th?.Jt the defendant 
~o w~s eppointed was absent from the state, end 
,, ttbsence, the ccart held, tolled the running 
f the stetute. 
The Supreme Courts of Alabama, I tllnols, 
'diene, low8, andWashJngton, cited in 119 ALR 
1ge 333, t eke the vIew t h:~·~ t the stet u t e simi I .3r 
, the Uteh statute Is unequlvocel In compre-
~ns1ve terms, and provides for the suspension 
thout regard to the character of the action es 
'personam, In rem, or quesl ;n rem, and that 
the leglsleture hed intended that proceedings 
rem which may be substituted for remedies in 
rsonam (such es ettechmentl, should be excluded 
om the operation of the suspension provision, 
e statute would have so provided, end that an 
ceptlon to that provision may not be made by 
~llcetion. The ALR Annotated points out that 
Is argument is adopted by the greater weight of 
thorlty. Cases from some twenty~seven states 
I listed in support of the view that the running 
the stetute wes tolled during the defendant's 
sence from the stete. 
In Bode vs. Flynn et et_ a Wisconsin case, 
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2~2 NWR, pege 284, the court held that en action 
for damages brought more than six years Jfter 
~curence of col llsion against non-resident 
d~fendant wes not berred by I imitations, even 
though plaintiff could heve served process upon 
5tcret:~ry of State ss permitted by statute. 
Th1s cese fs elmost identical with our case in so 
fer as the p.~Jnts of lew rttlsed by the defendant 
!reconcerned, ttnd represents the majority o~nJon. 
·• submit that this case sets forth the correct 
lne of re 5oning. 
The court said the following in 252 N~'\R, 
·•g• 285: 
"The appel Ients clai~ that section 35.05 
(3), Stats., which makes the secretary of 
state the attorney of e non-resident upon 
whom su~mons and c~nplclnt may be servea in 
ection growing out of his use of an auto-
mobile on the highways of the state, takes 
the defendants out of section 330.30, Stats._ 
which is to the general effect that, when 
e person Is out of the state when a cause 
~f action accrues against him. the statute 
of limitation does not commence to run 
unti I he comes Into or removes to the state, 
~nd le~ves the I imit~tion statute applicable 
Jn his fevor. The argument is that the 
purpose of the I imitation statute is to give 
the cl8iment slx yeers in which to bring 
this suit; end the purpose of exempting 
the period of ubaence from the stete is to 
give the claimant the full period fro,n the 
time he mey commence his suit; Bnd these 
purposes Bre fully effected by the statutory 
provision for cYrrnencing suit by service of 
process upon the secretary of state. The 
10 
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respondent clefms that the decision of this 
court in Stete v. N8tionel Accident Society 
of N.Y., 103 Wis. 208, 79 N.W. 220, 223, 
rules the point aq~inst the appel I ants. 
The case reiJ£d on by respondent was 
decided in 1899. The ~ction wes brought 
by the st~te against e foreign insurance 
corpor~tion after it hod withdrawn from 
the stete to recover the I icense fees for 
previous yeers during which it had been 
lice:1sed to do business therein. ~hen the 
action WdS begu~ more then six years had 
efapsed since the first fee involved was 
pay1ble. ~hen the cause of action for this 
license fee accrued, the statutes of l imi-
t8tion were es contained In ~.s. 1878. The 
section of those statutes applying to actions 
to recover for injuries to persons and 
property, and the statutes applying to 
persons without the state when the cause of 
action 8Ccrued, so far ~s here meterial, 
except in pa~tlculers later mentioned, were 
the same ~s the present statutes. Section 
4222, subd. 5, Rev. st. 1878, section 
330.19 (5) Stats. 1931; section 4231, Rev. 
~t. 187J, section 330.30, Stats. 1931. The 
18 t t er statutes JT ov l de that : • I f , when the 
cause of action shal I accrue against any 
person he shall be out of this state, such 
action may be commenced within the terms 
herein respectively I imlted after such 
person shal I return to or remove to this 
stete.• During the period wherein the 
license fees sued for were pay8bte, sec. 
1g15 subd. 2, Stats. 1898, made the insurance 
comm;ssloner do business Jn the stae upon 
whom legal process might be served. The 
court stated that it was "not unmindful of 
the • * • doctrine, that 'Nhen a corporation, 
pursu8nt to a statutory requirement, •naintains 
on attorney in the state upon whom process 
c~n be served* • • it is a resident of the 
1 1 
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state for et I the purposes of llt~tlon an~ 
therefore ent it I ed to the benefIt of e)(empt I\.. 
(generel I i ni tat I on) st..;tutes." But the 
court held that, notwlthst8nding the fact 
th~t the stete might h:1ve commenced en 
adion egelnst the insurance company by 
serving e summons upon the insurance comm-
Issioner et any time durin~ the period in-
volved, the statute of limitation did not 
opply in its fevor, because, "by section 
4231, Rev. St. (IJ78), it is excluded from 
t he bene f i t s o f ex emp t 1 on ( genera I t I 1n i t e t 1 on ) 
sttJtutes.~• It wt~s considered that the case 
of Tr0veters• Ins. :o. v. Fricke, 99 Wis, 
3~7, 74 N.·N. 372. 78 N.W. 407, 41 L.;~.A. 
557, determined thet the statute of I iml~ 
t et I on did not app I y in favor of foreign 
corpor~lon, elthough the statute as to 
service upon them was as above stated. The 
court says thet, if this were not otherwise 
correct, the 1897 amendment of the 1873 
st8tute, not contained in the statute when 
the Trevelers• Ins. Co. Case, supra, was 
decided, made Jt so. This amendment pro-
vided that the provision that action& might 
be brought 3Qainst nonresidents "returning 
to or removing to" the state, within the 
stBtutory period after their return or 
removal, sho..Jid not apply to foreign cor-
poration maintaining a manufacturing plant 
In the state which hed appointed a resident 
of the state upon whom process might be 
served. The argument in this resoeet was 
that the special e~lusion of one class of 
corporations from operet ion of the statute 
lndiceted a legislative Intent that no other 
cl~ss of corporations should be excluded. 
The •~ne re~soning would leave nonresident 
natural persons within section 330.30, even 
If they hed, as now, by virtue of section 
85.05 (3) 1 e person within the state upon 
whom service of summons and compleint might 
12 
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be ~ade, end thus make the present ectlon 
melntaJneble. 
To construe the statute es appel Janta 
co, t end we r;1 :J s t , e s s t e t e d , i n S t de v • 
N8tional Accident Society, supra, read into 
Section 330.~0 words thet ~re not there. 
The stetute says: "If when c person is out 
of the state when the cause of ect ion accrues·~' 
the s t ;' t u t e s h a I I no t r u n u n t i I he s h a t I 
"return to or remove to" the stete. The 
defendants, except Jensen, were out of the 
state when the Cduse of action against 
the~, 1ccrued. They have not removed to or 
returned to the st~te since. As to Jensen, 
president of the defendant labor union, he 
wes In the st~te when the action accrued, 
but he immediately left the state and has 
not "returned to or removed t 0 11 the s t de 
since. The Leglsl8ture could, had it seen 
fit, heve amended the statute as it did to 
corporations owning manufacturing plant&, 
etc., so ~s to cover all ~rsons and ell 
other corporations when a person represen-
ting then resided in the state upon whom 
service might be procured, but it has never 
done so. This leaves nonresident natural 
persons dS well as nonresident corporation 
not excepted by the 1897 amendment (chapter 
3)4), not entitled to the benefit of the 
s t ~ t u t e o f l i m i t e t i on, a t though t h e y have 
designed residents of the state as their 
attorneys upon whom process may be served. ~• 
In the CJse Staten vs. Weiss, 308 Pacific 2nd, 
age 1021, a case before the Supreme Court of 
daho on dete of March 14, 1957, the Supreme 
ourt hed before it the question 8lmost exactly 
ike out present case. The question presented 
~s whether the provisions of the statute of 
imi t.::t ion had bee~' to I I ed by an Idaho statute 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
wh I c h a t e t e s a a f o I I ows : 
"If, when the cause of action accrues against 
e person, he Js out of the state, the ection 
may be commenced within the term herein 
limited, efter his return to the stote, end 
If, efter the ceuse of ~ction accrues, he 
deperts from the state, the time of hJs 
ebsence is not part of the time limited 
for the comnencement of the action." 
It Js to be noted thut this statute is exactly 
the Sdme workino es the ~Jteh stetute set forth 
under Section 70-12-"35, u.c.A. 1953, except for 
ere word, "when", et the end of the first creuse 
of the Uteh stetute. The Utnh statute stetes, 
~ ••• eg~lnst e person when he is out of the state". 
we respect fu II y submit that the word "when•' makes 
no difference In the inee.nlng of the two statutes. 
The Defend~nt In the Idaho case contended 
that summons could have been served upon him et 
eny time efter the cause of action ~ccrued by 
serving the Secretary of State as the nonresi-
dent's attorney, 8nd that therefore, the tolling 
stetute was not applicable to the situation, 
and th,,t therefore, the two yeer statute eppl ied 
]nd the ect ion was b8rred. The Idaho Supreme 
:our t s e i d as f o I I ows : 
"Other courts of last resort have held 
that a statute which tolls the running of 
the statute of 1 imitations when a defendant 
is out of the state when the cause of 
ection accrues, or departs from the state 
thereafter, wil 1 be given effect even 
though service could have been obtained on 
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an 8gent within the state during his 
ebsence, for exemple, ~ non-resident 
~otor1st for Injuries lnfl lcted while 
using the hlghwftys of the stete. ~ome 
decisions teking the view that such possi-
ble service on the Secretary of State of 
other designeted involunt~ry agent is 
lmm~terlel end the statute stops running 
during the period of absence from the 
st~, notwithstanding the motor vehicle 
statute, ·:ec. 49-1101 and Sec. 49-1202, 
1 • C., or s J m i I 8r I eg; s let ion are a 
Gotheiner v. Lenihen, 20 N.J. Misc. I 19, 
25 A. 2d 430; Bode v. Flynn, 213 Wis. 
509, 252 N.w. 284, 94 A.L.R. 480; Couts v. 
Rose, 152 Ohio St. 458, 90 N.E. 2d 139; 
MdJUJre v. Yellow Taxi Corporation, 253 
App. Div. 249, I N.Y.S. 2d 749, affirmed 
27 8 N • Y • 57 6, I 6 N • E • 2 d I I 0 J N, a c r i V • 
Flcherty, o.c., 115 F. Supp. 739. 
In Anthes v. Anthes, 21 Idaho 305, 
121 P. 553, suit was brought on a pro-
missory note which would have been barred 
by th@ provisions of whet Is now Sec. 
5- 229, I.e. At that time service of 
surrmons -.Jnd co,1lpl8lnt could be made "by 
leaving 8 copy thereof and e copy of the 
complaint in the cause at the usual piece 
of ebode of the defendant with 8 member of 
the femily over the age of twenty-one 
years.~• Laws 1907, 0. 321. 
~hile the defendant Jn that case was a 
resident, he was absent from the state 
continuously for a period of time sufficient 
to to I I the stat :J t e of I i m i t utI on s. This 
Court held that the statute which provided 
e method of service of process upon a 
resident of the state, tempor~rily absent 
from hjs residence or from the state, did 
not 8mend ~ec. 5.229, I.C. Cthe tot ling 
s t ~t u te) ~nd the t the s tot u t e of I fm it at ions 
ceased to run during the period of absence. 
15 
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The s8me principle is ennounced in Keith 
O"~rien ··:o, v. Snyder, 51 Utah 227, 169 P. 
954. That Court held thatJ "* • * if, when 
the ~ause of ection accrues ag~inst a person, 
he is uut of the state, the ection mey be 
cormenced within the term llrnited after his 
retJr-n t·) the stete, and if, after the cause 
of :;·:t J '1il :iccrues, he dep.~rts from the state, 
the time ~~ his absence is not part of the 
time I imi ted for the corrmencement of the 
ectlon, applies though the debtor has a 
place of ebode or residence within the 
state so that process mi3ht have been 
served notolthstending his absence.'• 
See also Buel I v. Duchesne Mercantile 
~o., 64 Utah 3Y1 1 231 P, i23. 
In Roberts v. Hudson, 49 Idaho 132, 
2~6 P. 354, this court held that the 
s t a t u t e o f I i m i t a t i on s r u n s i n f av or of 
the debtor only while he is actually in 
the st8te end IS tolled as soon as he 
leaves the state. 
~eny states h~ve passed statutes similar 
to 3ecs. 49-1201 and 49.1202, I.C. which In 
subst~nce provide that non-resident owners, 
operetors of, or persons riding in motor 
vehicles ere granted the privilege ofusing 
the roads, highways and streets of this 
state and thQt by so doing auch operator, or 
other persons therein enumerated shal I be 
deemed the equivalent to en appointment by 
such non .. resident of the Secretary of ~)tate 
of the st,te of Idaho, to be hi& true and 
lawful ettorney, upon wh~~ may 0e served 
<Jil lawful s~.J'mlonses and processes a~ainst 
~i~ growing out of any accident or ltabi lity 
in which seid non-resident •n-:ty be involved 
while opereting, causing, or permitting 
the operation of a motor vehicle upon such 
hishweys. 
11) Under the statute, Sec. 49~1202, 1. 
c., the eppointment of the Secretary of 
16 
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3t~te as such motorist's attorney is an 
J nvo I Jn t er y, I rrevocdb t e one. i·{.Jr, is bare 
service 'ln the Secretary of Sttfe sufficie·nt 
for the court to ecqufre jurisdiction of 
the controversy. The statute further 
provides: "* • * such service sht!ll be 
sufficient end valid personel service upon 
seJd non-residentJ provided, notice of 
such service 6nd a~py of the process is 
forthwith sent by registered mail by the 
plaintiff to the defendant, and the defen. 
dent's return receipt ~nd plaintiff's 
ef f i dev It of comp I i ence· herewith are 
appended to the process 8nd entered es a 
part of the return thereof; provided 
further, that personel service outside of 
the stt.ste in accordance.with the provisions 
of the stetutes of ldeho relating to personal 
aervice of summons outside of the state 
1 he I I r e I I e v e a p I ;) i n t i f f f r om rn o i I i n g 
copies of the summons or process by reg;s~ 
tared mei I as hereinbefore provided. 
Service of said process upon a defendent 
shell not be complete until the same is 
either made by registered mai I or by 
person., I service outside of the 3 t0te. ~; 
It thusly appears that in case of service 
of summons Gnd complaint on the Secretery 
of State as the involuntary Bgent of o 
non-resident motorist is Incomplete unless 
the same Is sent by registered mai I to the 
defendBnt and defendant's return receipt 
secured, or in lieu thereof, personal 
service made outside the state of such 
sum11ons and ccmplaint. The provision for 
obt~ining such service c ntains no specific 
exception to the provisions tolling the 
stetute oi 1 irni tat ion, :..ec. 5-229. l.C. 
Nor C8n we read such en exception into the 
motor vehicle act. The statutes for 
Interpretation are not in irreconciable 
con f 1 i ct. 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(2) We ere therefore constrained to 
hold th~t where ~ st~tute to I Is the running 
of the statute of llmit8tlons when the 
defer.dt·nt Is out of the state when the 
cause of ·:ction eccrues, or dep,Jrts from 
the state thereafter wi I I be given effect 
even though service could have been 
obtelned nn .":Jn involuntary egent, in this 
cese the Secretary of st~te, during his 
abaence." 
CONCL US I 0~~ 
1. Under the provision O·f Section 78-12-35,. 
lfeh Code Annoteted 1953, the absence of the 
efendants from the state of utah tolled the 
unnln·J of the statute of llmi tat ions, and, 
herefore, the judgment of the lower court sho~d 
e affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
18 
Hugh Vern 'nentz 
A t t or n e y f or P l e i n t i f f 
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